

Message Text

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 USUN N 01602 01 OF 02 210328Z
ACTION IO-06

INFO OCT-01 SS-14 ISO-00 NSC-05 NSCE-00 EUR-08 EA-06
PM-03 SP-02 L-01 INR-05 CIAE-00 DODE-00 ACDA-10
TRSE-00 /061 W
-----210420Z 118294 /11

R 210214Z MAY 77
FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3697
INFO AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS
AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA
AMEMBASSY SAN JOSE
AMEMBASSY SEOUL
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 USUN 1602

LIMDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, UNGA, KN, KS
SUBJECT: KOREAN AT 32ND UNGA-- MEETING OF CORE GROUP MAY 18

REF: A. USUN 1578
B. NEW DELHI 5415 NOTAL
C. CINCUNC 090811Z MAY 1977 NOTAL
D. USUN 1539
E. STATE 113291 NOTAL
F. USUN 1310

1. AT CORE GROUP MEETING ON MAY 18 (SUMMARY REPORTED REFTEL A),
JAPAN OPENED DISCUSSION IN PRESENTING VIEWS CONCERNING RECENT
NEW DELHI NON-LIGNED COORDINATING COMMITTEE MEETING (NACCFM).
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 USUN N 01602 01 OF 02 210328Z

IN THIS CONNECTION, JAPAN FELT KOREAN QUESTION WAS TREATED AS
A SIDE ISSUE AND NOTED RELATIVE ALGERIAN RESTRAINT IN PUTTING
FORTH AN AMENDMENT TO THE INDIAN DRAFT, JAPAN FELT, HOWEVER, THAT
IT WOULD BE UNWISE TO ASSUME THAT NORTH KOREANS WOULD BE AS
DOCILE AT UPCOMING GA AS WAS CASE IN NEW DELHI. FURTHER, SINCE
THERE WAS SPARSE EVIDENCE OF PROVOCATIVE MOVES ON PART OF
NORTH KOREA AT PRESENT, THE JAPANESE URGED VIGILANCE THAT

CORE GROUP ACTIVITY NOT LEAK OUT THEREBY PROVOKING SUSPICION.

2. AS TO REASONS FOR NORTH KOREAN HIGH AT NACCFM, UK POINTED TO TWO POSSIBLE REASONS: FIRST, NORTH KOREA'S SUPPORTERS, ESPECIALLY YUGOSLAVIA, HAVE BECOME INCREASINGLY DISENCHANTED WITH THE ATTITUDE AND BEHAVIOR OF NORTH KOREA AND CITED AS AN EXAMPLE LAST YEAR'S DRUG SCANDAL. SECOND, AND POSSIBLE MORE IMPORTANTLY, GIVEN A NEW U.S. ADMINISTRATION, THE NON-ALIGNED NATIONS ARE ANXIOUS NOT TO PUSH TOO HARD BUT TO REMAIN MODERATE WHILE THE NEW ADMINISTRATION IS FORMULATING ITS POLICY. ADDITIONALLY, IN THE UK VIEW, NORTH KOREA'S POSITION HAS BEEN UNDERCUT BY PRESIDENT CARTER'S STATEMENTS ON GROUND TROOP WITHDRAWAL FROM KOREA. US AGREED, DRAWING ON REF B.

3. ON REQUEST OF CANADA, US SIDE COMMENTED ON MAY 3 DMZ INCIDENT UTILIZING REF C. ROK THEN COMMENTED ON SUBSEQUENT MAY 10 FISHING BOAT INCIDENT. ROK (MISSOFT PARK) INTIMATED THAT THE TWO INCIDENTS WERE POSSIBLE CONTRIVED BY NORTH KOREA TO GIVE ROK IMAGE OF PROVOCATEUR THROUGH FALSE CHARGES THAT THE ROK HAD STAGED THEM. JAPAN MODESTLY DISAGREED WITH THE ROK ANALYSIS AND STATED THAT PROVOCATIVE ACTS LIKE THESE WOULD PROBABLY HARM NORTH KOREAN IMAGE EVEN FURTHER. CANADA REJOINED THAT PERHAPS TOO MUCH WAS READ INTO THE INCIDENTS. IT ALSO SUGGESTED THAT THERE MIGHT BE A DICHOTOMY BETWEEN NORTH KOREAN INTELLIGENCE ZEALOTS AND MORE RESTRAINED GOVERNMENT ELEMENTS IN THE DPRK. UK ADDED THAT HE SAW LITTLE PROPAGANDA ADVANTAGE (TO THE NORTH) IN INCIDENTS SUCH AS THESE.
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 USUN N 01602 01 OF 02 210328Z

4. ROK REVERTED TO THE NACCFM BY STATING THAT THE NORTH KOREANS MIGHT NOT HAVE HAD SUCH AMBITIOUS DESIGNS FOR THE NACCFM AS THE CORE GROUP MIGHT HAVE ANTICIPATED. HE NOTED THAT NO APPROACH WAS MADE TO INDIA'S UN MISSION PRIOR TO THE MEETING BY THE NORTH KOREANS AND THEY SENT ONLY A 5-MAN DELEGATION TO NEW DELHI. ALTHOUGH NEW DELHI WAS EVIDENTLY A SETBACK FOR NORTH KOREANS, THE GROUP SHOULD NOT BE GIVEN TO OPTIMISM AS IT WOULD BE PREMATURE TO DRAW JUDGEMENTS FROM NEW DELHI. ROK OFFERED THAT NORTH KOREANS MAY HAVE WAITED TO SEE HOW THEY WOULD FARE AT NEW DELHI, THEN MAP OUT A STRATEGY BASED ON THE RESULT OF NACCFM. WHEN QUERIED BY THE US AS TO RELATIVE LEVEL OF NORTH KOREA'S 1977 DIPLOMATIC ACTIVITY AS AGAINST THAT OF 1976, ROK JUDGED THAT THERE HAD BEEN NO DECLINE.

5. IN DISCUSSING ITEM 3 OF THE AGENDA ON NORTH KOREAN INTENTIONS, CANADA FELT THAT NORTH KOREAN INTENTIONS MAY BE LESS NEGATIVE IN 1977. CANADA ASKED FOR ROK ASSESS-

MENT. ROK SAID THAT THE TACTICS OF THE NORTH KOREANS REMAIN UNCHANGED BUT THAT THEY HAVE DETECTED A SHIFT IN MOOD, I.E., THAT NORTH KOREA HAS MODERATED ITS CONFRONTATIONAL POSTURE. THE BASIC NORTH KOREAN OBJECTIVES, HOWEVER, REMAIN UNCHANGED. ROK REITERATED SEOUL'S INSTRUCTIONS IT PREMATURE TO MAKE OPTIMISTIC ASSESSMENTS. FURTHER, THAT WHEN DISCUSSING ACTION, CORE GROUP COULD NOT START WITHOUT HYPOTHETICAL ASSUMPTIONS AS TO WHAT NORTH KOREA WOULD DO OR WHAT THEY WOULD NOT DO. ROK STATED THAT AT THIS EARLY STAGE THEY HAD NO PRIMA FACIE CASE THAT WOULD INDICATE NORTH KOREAN DECISION FOR CONFRONTATION IN FORTHCOMING UNGA. NEVERTHELESS, IT HAD CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE SUGGESTING THAT NORTH KOREA IS WORKING HARD TO DEVELOP SUPPORT AT THE UNGA. HE CITED AS EVIDENCE ENERGETIC NORTH KOREAN DIPLOMATIC MOVES WITH THE NON-ALIGNED (REF D). FROM THAT HE CONCLUDED THAT, IF NORTH KOREA FEELS IT CAN MUSTER MORE VOTES THAN AT

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 USUN N 01602 01 OF 02 210328Z

THE 30TH GA, THEY WOULD PROVOKE ACTION IN THE FORTHCOMING GA. HE REEMPHASIZED NORTH KOREAN EFFORTS TO SWING GABON, LESOTHO, AND CENTRAL AFRICAN EMPIRE AWAY FROM ROK SUPPORT. THERE WERE ALSO SEVERAL NEW MEMBER STATES WHICH MIGHT PREDICTABLY SUPPORT NORTH KOREA. MENTIONED IN THIS CONNECTION WERE DJIBOUTI, ANGOLA AND SOCIALIST REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM. ROK FEARED TOO THAT PAKISTAN WAS DRIFTING INTO DPRK CAMP AFTER ALI BHUTTO'S PYONGYANG VISIT. ROK ALSO MENTIONED THAT GUYANA'S PRESIDENT HAD VISITED PYONGYANG ON APRIL 30TH. ROK FEARED THAT GUYANA WOULD PRESSURE ITS NEIGHBOR SURINAM ON KOREAN QUESTION. ADDITIONALLY, IT WAS LIKELY THAT THE PRESIDENT OF BURMA WOULD BE VISITING PYONGYANG SOON. ROK RELATED THAT KIM IL-SUNG AND SENT AN INVITATION TO NE WIN FOR THE VISIT, THROUGH THE NORTH KOREAN AMBASSADOR TO BURMA, WHEN THE LATTER PRESENTED HIS CREDENTIALS. IN ANOTHER STEP, NORTH KOREA HAD SENT AN IMPORTANT MISSION TO THE SEYCHELLES. UK NOTED THIS WAS PROBABLY AN EFFORT TO PATCH UP DAMAGE DONE THERE BY DPRK LAST FALL.

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 USUN N 01602 02 OF 02 210411Z

ACTION IO-06

INFO OCT-01 SS-14 ISO-00 NSC-05 NSCE-00 PM-03 SP-02

L-01 INR-05 CIAE-00 DODE-00 ACDA-10 EUR-08 EA-07

TRSE-00 /062 W

-----210420Z 118763 /11

R 210214Z MAY 77

FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3698

INFO AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS

AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE

AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY OTTAWA

AMEMBASSY SAN JOSE

AMEMBASSY SEOUL

AMEMBASSY TOKYO

AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 2 USUN 1602

LIMDIS

6. AS FOR CONCRETE INDICATIONS OF DPRK INTENTIONS, ROK CITED RECALL OF NORTH KOREAN AMBASSADORS TO PYONGYANG EARLY THIS YEAR. RECENTLY, DPRK AMBASSADADOR HAD RETURNED TO KATHMANDU, AND REQUESTED A MEETING WITH VICE FOREIGN MINISTER. ACCORDING TO SEOUL'S AMBASSADOR IN KATHMANDU, NORTH KOREAN AMBASSADOR TOLD VICE FOREIGN MINISTER THAT PYONGYANG CLEARLY INTENDED TO INTRODUCE A RESOLUTION AT THE UNGA THIS YEAR. THE NEPALI PERM REP IN NEW YORK, HOWEVER, COULD NOT CONFIRM THIS REPORT. ROK ALSO OPINED THAT NORTH KOREANS MAY FEAR KOREAN QUESTION WILL BE DEAD IF THEY ARE UNABLE TO GET IT ON AGENDA THIS YEAR.

7. ROK THEN GAVE SEOUL'S VIEWS REGARDINGSOME NORTH KOREAN OPTIONS THIS YEAR. FIRST OPTION INCLUDES SUBMISSION OF A DRAFT CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 USUN N 01602 02 OF 02 210411Z

RESOLUTION, USING HARDLINE LANGUAGE, CALLING FOR WITHDRAWAL OF ALL US FORCES (INCLUDING AIR) AND DISSOLUTION OF UNITED NATIONS (UN) COMMAND. SEOUL OPINED THAT, IF US AIR FORCES WERE TO REMAIN IN ROK, NORTH KOREA WOULD BE MORE LIKELY TO INTRODUCE SUCH A RESOLUTION. SECOND OPTION WOULD BE TO REEMPHASIZE JANUARY 25 CALL FOR POLITICAL CONFERENCE OF ALL KOREAN PARTIES CONCERNED (EXCEPT ROK GOVERNMENT) AND FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF PRO-NORTH KOREAN DRAFT RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY 30TH UNGA. THIRD OPTION WOULD BE SIMPLE INSCRIPTION OF A KOREAN ITEM ON DRAFT UNGA

AGENDA. WHETHER OR NOT DRAFT ITEM WOULD THEM BE SUPPLEMENTED WITH EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM AND DRAFT RESOLUTION WOULD LEAVE PRO-NORTH KOREAN SIDE FLEXIBILITY FOR FUTURE ACTION. IT WAS NOTED IN GROUP THAT SUCH ACTION WOULD BE INCONSISTENT WITH "RULES OF PROCEDURE" BUT THERE WAS PRECEDENT FOR INSCRIPTION OF ITEMS WITHOUT EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM AND/OR DRAFT RESOLUTION.

8. AFTER ROK PRESENTATION, GROUP COMMENTED ON PARTS OF IT. UK STATED THAT NORTH KOREAN DIPLOMATIC ACTIVITIES (REF D) COULD ALSO BE SEEN AS CONSISTENT WITH LONG-TERM POLICIES AND STRATEGY AND PERHAPS NOT NECESSARILY DIRECTED STRICTLY AT FORTHCOMING UNGA. UK HOWEVER, TOOK FULL NOTE OF STATEMENT ATTRIBUTED TO NORTH KOREAN AMBASSADOR TO NEPAL AND, ON THE OTHER HAND, THE PERCEIVED RESTRAINT OF NORTH KOREA. BRITISH WONDERED TOO HOW FAR THE SUPPORTERS OF NORTH KOREANS WOULD BE PREPARED TO GO. AFTER ALL, THESE SUPPORTERS WOULD BE THE ONES TO INSCRIBE A DRAFT AGENDA ITEM.

9. NEW ZEALAND COMMENTED ON POSSIBILITY OF A NEW, MORE MODERATE HOSTILE RESOLUTION. IN THIS CONNECTION, NEW ZEALAND NOTED MORE MODERATE STANCES OF ALGERIA AND YUGOSLAVIA. NEW ZEALAND SUGGESTED, AS A POSSIBILITY, THAT A DRAFT RESOLUTION MIGHT "TAKE NOTE OF US TROOP WITHDRAWAL...URGE FURTHER TROOP WITHDRAWAL, ETC." CANADA AGREED WITH NEW ZEALAND ASSESSMENT, I.E., THAT A MORE MODERATE RESOLUTION COULD

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 USUN N 01602 02 OF 02 210411Z

BE FORTHCOMING AND URGED THAT THE GROUP REMAIN FLEXIBLE IN ORDER TO MEET AND COPE WITH A LESS HARSH TEXT.

10. ROK SUGGESTED THAT INDIVIDUAL CORE GROUP MEMBERS MIGHT DISCREETLY SOUND OUT SOME DPRK SUPPORTERS AS TO 1977 INTENTIONS: E.G. CHINA, USSR, ALGERIA, YUGOSLAVIA, AND RUMANIA. UK, HOWEVER, FEARED THAT THIS COULD TRIGGER PRO-NORTH KOREAN ACTION AND COULD HAVE THE OPPOSITE OF INTENDED RESULTS. COSTA RICA AGREED AND SAID THAT THE CHINESE HAD IMPLIED TO COSTA RICANS THAT LAST YEAR THE NORTH KOREANS HAD BEEN PUSHED INTO ACTION BY CORE GROUP ACTIVITIES. JAPAN TOO SUPPORTED CAUTION, BELIEVING THAT LOW-KEY APPROACHES IF ANY SHOULD BE IN CAPITALS AND IN CONTEXT OF DISCUSSING OTHER UN ISSUES. JAPAN FELT IT YET EARLY TO TAKE UP 32ND UNGA ISSUES AS A WHOLE IN CAPITALS. CANADA CONCURRED AND REMINDED THAT LAST YEAR SOME GOVERNMENTS HAD BEEN PUT OUT BY CORE GROUP DEMARCHES BY THE GROUP AS A WHOLE. THEY HAD THOUGHT THESE "UNUSUAL", CANADA SAID. US AGREED ON DESIRABILITY OF LOW PROFILE CORE GROUP POSTURE (REF E).

11. GROUP DECIDED HOWEVER, THAT IT IMPORTANT TO KEEP

EARS TO GROUND FOR FURTHER INDICATIONS OF NORTH KOREAN INTENTIONS. THERE WAS CONSENSUS THAT THIS MUST BE DONE WITH GREAT DISCRETION SO AS NOT BE PROVOKE OTHER SIDE OR DISPLAY ANXIETY ON PART OF SOUTH KOREA OR CORE GROUP. THEREFORE, SPECIFIC APPROACHES AT CAPITALS OR IN NEW YORK WERE DECIDED AGAINST. RATHER, CORE GROUP REPRESENTATIVES SHOULD LISTEN CAREFULLY IN CONVERSATIONS AT CAPITALS, NEW YORK AND INTERNATIONAL MEETINGS FOR INDICATIONS OF INTENTIONS OF NORTH KOREA AND ITS SUPPORTERS. MAPUTO CONFERENCE WAS UNDERLINED AS A POSSIBLE SOURCE OF SUCH INFORMATION.

12. AS TO FUTURE CORE GROUP MEETINGS, CANADA THOUGHT THAT ACTIVITY OF CORE GROUP MIGHT PROVE PROVOCATIVE AND CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 USUN N 01602 02 OF 02 210411Z

THAT, THEREFORE, MEETINGS SHOULD BE SUSPENDED UNTIL JUST BEFORE UNGA. OTHERS SHARED SIMILAR VIEWS THAT CORE GROUP ACTIVITIES SHOULD NOT WORK AGAINST GROUP'S GOALS. US SUGGESTED, HOWEVER, THAT MEETINGS IN JUNE AND LATER COULD PROVE TIMELY TO EXCHANGE REPORTS POSSIBLY FROM MAPUTO AND ELSEWHERE. MEETING CONCLUDED WITH DECISION THAT ROK CHAIRMAN SHOULD CALL MEETINGS IN JUNE WHEN HE HAD RECEIVED REPORTS FROM MEMBERS INDICATING MEETING WOULD PROVE USEFUL. (CHAIRMAN PRELIMINARILY CONSIDERING MEETING ON OR ABOUT JUNE 10.) US ALSO EMPAHSIZED DANGER THAT TOTALLY MORIBUND CORE GROUP MIGHT BE READ AS SIGN OF WEAKNESS AND FRAGMENTATION AND THEREBY ENCOURAGE UNDESIRABLE ACTION BY OTHER SIDE.

13. THE CONCLUSION BY CONSENSUS WAS THAT PYONGYANG HAD NOT YET DECIDED WHETHER TO PRESS FOR A NEW UNGA OFFENSIVE. ACCORDINGLY, GROUP THOUGHT IT AS YET EARLY TO PROCEED TO AGENDA ITEM 4: "DISCUSSION OF FUTURE STRATEGY" (REF F).
LEONARD

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: Z
Capture Date: 01-Jan-1994 12:00:00 am
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: NONALIGNED NATIONS, POLICIES, COMMITTEE MEETINGS
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Sent Date: 21-May-1977 12:00:00 am
Decaption Date: 22 May 2009
Decaption Note: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 22 May 2009
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1977USUNN01602
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: GS
Errors: N/A
Expiration:
Film Number: D770181-0430
Format: TEL
From: USUN NEW YORK
Handling Restrictions:
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1977/newtext/t19770530/aaaabaii.tel
Line Count: 317
Litigation Code IDs:
Litigation Codes:
Litigation History:
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Message ID: 11e1428c-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Office: ACTION IO
Original Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Original Handling Restrictions: LIMDIS
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 6
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Previous Handling Restrictions: LIMDIS
Reference: 77 USUN NEW YORK 1578, 77 NEW DELHI 5415, 77 USUN NEW YORK 1539
Retention: 0
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 27-Dec-2004 12:00:00 am
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review Media Identifier:
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
SAS ID: 2419202
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: KOREAN AT 32ND UNGA-- MEETING OF CORE GROUP MAY 18
TAGS: PFOR, KN, KS, UNGA, CORE GROUP
To: STATE
Type: TE
vdkgvwkey: odb://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS_Docs/11e1428c-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Review Markings:
Margaret P. Grafeld
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
22 May 2009
Markings: Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 22 May 2009